Abstract Chaotic behavior arising from very simple non-linear dynamical equation of logistic map makes it was used often in designing chaotic image encryption schemes. However, some properties of chaotic maps can also facilitate cryptanalysis especially when they are implemented in digital domain. Utilizing stable distribution of the chaotic states generated by iterating the logistic map, this paper present a typical example to show insecurity of an image encryption scheme using chaotic logistic map. This work will push encryption and chaos be combined in a more effective way.
Introduction
With the rapid development of information transmission technology and popularization of multimedia capture device, multimedia data are transmitted over all kinds of wired/wireless networks more and more frequently. Consequently, the security of multimedia data becomes a serious concern of many people. However, the traditional text encryption schemes cannot protect multimedia data efficiently, mainly due to the big differences between textual and multimedia data, such as strong redundancy between neighboring elements of uncompressed multimedia data, bulky size of multimedia data, and some special requirements of the whole multimedia processing system. This challenge stirs the design of special multimedia encryption schemes to become a hot research topic in multimedia processing area in the past two decades.
Because there are some subtle similarities between chaos and cryptography, chaos were used to design potential secure and efficient schemes in all kinds of applications in cryptography. Due to easy presentation of image datum, most cryptographic schemes consider image data as operation object [6, 17, 22] . According to the record of Web of Science, about two thousands of articles on chaos-based cryptology were published in the past two decades. Unfortunately, many of them have been found to have security problems of different degree from the viewpoint of modern cryptology [2, 3, 7, [9] [10] [11] 24] . In general, cryptanalysis (breaking or reporting some security defects) of a given encryption scheme requires rigorous theoretical support, so only about one tenth of the proposed chaos-based encryption schemes were reported being cryptanalyzed till now. At the same time, the conventional cryptanalysis skills cannot be directly used to break the chaos-based encryption schemes due to some reasons, such as difference of essential structure, and some special security defects caused by the properties of the adopted chaos system [5, 13, 25] . Therefore, short of security scrutiny of the proposed chaos-based encryption schemes has become bottleneck of progress of chaos-based cryptology. Some general rules about evaluating security of chaosbased encryption schemes are concluded in [1, 14] .
Logistic map is a discrete quadratic recurrence form of the logistic equation, a model of population growth first published by P. Verhulst in 1845. The application of logistic map in cryptology can be traced back to John von Neumann's suggestion on utilizing it as a random number generator in 1947 [23] . Due to simple form and relatively complex dynamical properties of logistic map, it was extensively used to design encryption schemes or pseudo-random number generator [4, 8, 20] . Even in Web of Science, one can find about two hundred records on application of logistic map in cryptography published between 1998 and 2013. A few papers reported some security deficiencies caused by logistic map [15, 19] .
In [18] , an image encryption scheme based on the logistic and standard maps was proposed, where the two maps are iterated to generate some pseudo-random number sequences (PRNS) controlling twice exclusive OR (XOR) operations. In [21] , it is reported that an equivalent key of the scheme can be obtained from only one known/chosen plain-image and the corresponding cipher-image. However, the equivalent key can only be used to decrypt other cipher-images of smaller or the same size of the known/chosen plain-image. Based on a dynamical property of logistic map on stable distribution of its chaotic states, the present paper re-evaluates the security of the scheme, and finds that the scope of all the sub-keys can be narrowed much by an efficient brute-force search.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the image encryption scheme under study briefly. Our cryptanalytic results are presented in Sec. 3 in detail. The last section concludes the paper.
The image encryption scheme under study
The plaintext encrypted by the image encryption scheme under study is a RGB true-color image of size M × N (height×width), which can be denoted by an M × N matrix of 3-tuple pixel values
, the image encryption scheme can be described as follows 1 .
-Secret key: three floating-point numbers x 0 , y 0 , K, and one integer L, where x 0 , y 0 ∈ (0, 2π), K > 18, 100 < L < 1100. -Initialization: prepare data for encryption/decryption by performing the following steps. a) Generate four XORing keys as follows:
by assigning an M ×N matrix with the four XORing keys repeatedly:
and
where k = iN + j + 1. -Encryption procedure: a simple concatenation of the following four encryption operations.
-Confusion I : masking the plain pixel values by the four XORing keys {Xkey(i)}
-Diffusion I : scanning all pixel values from the first one row by row (from top to bottom), and masking each pixel (except for the first scanned pixel) by its predecessor in the scan.
-Diffusion II : scanning all pixel values from the last one column by column (from right to left), and masking each pixel (except for the first scanned pixel) by its predecessor in the scan. 
-Decryption procedure is the simple reversion of the above encryption procedure.
Cryptanalysis
In [21, Sec. 4.2], it has been reported that an equivalent secret key of the image encryption scheme under study can be reconstructed with only one pair of known plainimage and the corresponding cipher-image. More rigorous presentation of the attack was represented in [12, Sec. 3.1] . The equivalent form of the secret key can only decrypt other cipher-image of smaller or the same size of the known plain-image. In this section, we first briefly introduce how the equivalent secret key is obtained, then discuss how to derive further information about secret key utilizing special dynamical properties of the logistic map. Denoting the horizontal and vertical diffusion processes by HD and VD, respectively, the image encryption scheme under study can be represented as 
and I * Xkey = VD(HD(I Xkey ).
As both HD and VD are independent on the secret key and I key is dependent on neither the plaintext I nor the ciphertext I , one can see that I key can be used as an equivalent key to decrypt any ciphertext of size which is smaller than or equal to M × N , encrypted by the same secret key (x 0 , y 0 , K, L). In the following, we will show that the scope of x 0 , y 0 , K, and L can be further narrowed under the same condition. The key idea of the enhanced attack is to search the values of {Xkey(i)} 3 i=0 by brute-force and verify the search with stable self-correlation of the blue channel of I CKS , {CKSB(i, j)} 0≤i≤M −1
, which is obtained from states of logistic map. Two main points supporting the attack are described as follows.
-Deterministic relationship between {Xkey(i)} 
As well known, distribution of chaotic trajectories generated by iterating the map Eq. (1) is stable. To verify this, distributions of a great number of chaotic trajectories generated by iterating Logistic map Eq. (1) for 10 5 times under random initial conditions were studied. All the distributions are quite similar to each other, so only one typical example is shown in Fig. 1 (See the invariant density of logistic map with parameter r = 4 in [16, Fig. 2]) . Furthermore, distribution of ∆ k is stable also under different values of z 0 . To verify this point, a great number of initial values of z 0 are chosen randomly. For each value of z 0 , the corresponding sequence {z k } is produced by transforming the corresponding logistical states with Eq. (2). As distributions of ∆ k are similar to each other, only the distribution of ∆ k under the initial value used in Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 2 . To show the point more clearly, the distribution of ∆ k over some given intervals are shown in Table 1 . In addition, distribution of ∆ k is very sensitive to change ofz k orz k+1 ( See Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5) . So, this stable self-correlation of {CKSB(i, j)} 0≤i≤M −1 0≤j≤N −1 can be used to verify the search of {Xkey(i)} k /256 Fig. 3 The version of the distribution shown in Fig. 2 when onlyz k is wrong:z k is replaced byz k + 1.
Calculate the distribution of {∆
, and output the search value if the distribution match with the expected one (Refer to Table 1).
Once {Xkey(i)} 3 i=0 are determined, one can obtain K = Xkey(2) mod 256, L = Xkey(3)+n·256, n = 1 ∼ 4, Table 1 The distribution of ∆ k corresponding to the initial state z 0 = 0.226. Fig. 4 The version of the distribution shown in Fig. 2 when onlyz k+1 is wrong:z k+1 is replaced byz k+1 + 1. Obviously, the complexity of the whole attack is
, where L is the number of plain-bytes to be calculated. Considering L = 256 is enough for counting the distribution of
, the complexity of the attack is O(2 40 ). Note that the complexity of the attack can be reduced much by dividing the attack into the following two stages: 1) search for the possible values of {Xkey(i)} 
where #(·) denotes cardinality of a set. In this case, the complexity is reduced to O(2 36 ). For a PC with CPU of 2.83GHz and RAM of 2.98GB, the attack can be completed within eleven minutes. A number of experiments were made to verify the correctness of the above attack. With the secret key (x 0 , y 0 , K, L) = (3.98235562892545, 1.34536356538912, 108.54365761256745, 110), the out of the first stage of the attack is {160, 54, 108, 108}, {162, 54, 108, 110}. Then, the 16 possible neighboring values of each set are verified further, the distributions of ∆ k correspondig for the second set are shown in Table 2. Obviously, the data shown in third row of Table 2 is closed to the data shown in Table 1 most. So, {Xkey(i)} 3 i=0 = {162, 54, 109, 110}. One can further obtain that K = 109 mod 256, L = 110 + n · 256, n = 1 ∼ 3, x 0 ∈ [81/64·π, 163/128·π), y 0 ∈ [27/64·π, 55/128·π).
Conclusion
In this paper, the security of a new image encryption scheme based on logistic map is re-analyzed in detail. Although it was reported that equivalent secret key of the encryption scheme can be reconstructed with only one pair of known-plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext, this paper further finds that the scope of all the sub-keys can be narrowed further with relatively low computation under the same condition. The results reported in this paper will help study security of other image encryption schemes based on logistic map. 
